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I n Harris v. State, 344 Md. 497, 687 A.2d 970, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
reversed the lower court's decision 
that authorized a trial court to 
order the Public Defender's Office 
to appoint standby counsel for a 
defendant who willingly waived 
his right to counsel. Although it 
acknowledged that the trial court 
retains such power in specific 
instances, the court of appeals held 
that this case did not warrant a 
showing of the requisite factual 
background to allow such action. 
In so holding, the court offered a 
narrow precedent limiting the 
ability of a defendant to invoke the 
assistance of counsel. 
Defendant Bruce Wayne 
Koenig ("Koenig") was charged 
with the murder of his parents, and 
subsequently faced the death 
penalty or life in prison without 
parole. Although informed of the 
seriousness of the charges against 
him, Koenig willingly waived his 
Sixth Amendment right to assis-
tance of counsel due to dis-
agreements with the initial 
attorney appointed to him by the 
State. Koenig later requested the 
assistance of standby counsel to 
help formulate his defense. 
In response to this request, the 
trial court ordered the Public 
Defender's Office ("OPD") to 
appoint standby counsel. The 
OPD appealed to the court of 
special appeals, and argued that 
the trial court lacked the requisite 
statutory authority to order such 
action. In response to the inter-
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mediate appellate court's affirm-
ance of the trial court's action, the 
OPD petitioned for certiorari from 
the court of appeals. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by examining the stat-
utory basis for the OPD's 
argument. The OPD asserted that 
the trial court misinterpreted 
Article 27 A of the Maryland Code, 
which provides for the constitu-
tional guarantees of a defendant's 
right to counsel. Harris v. State, 
344 Md. 497, S08, 687 A.2d 970, 
97S. The court agreed with the 
underlying message of the statute, 
and acknowledged the right to 
representation under the Sixth 
Amendment. Id. at S04, 687 A.2d 
at 973. The court limited this 
broad interpretation, however, by 
citing Faretta v. State, 422 U.S. 
806 (197S). In Faretta v. State, 
the Supreme Court held that a 
criminal defendant is entitled to "a 
choice between representation by 
counsel and self-
representation," but not both. 
Harris at SOS, 687 A.2d at 973-74 
(quoting Farretta, 422 U.S. at 
82S). 
Based on this premise, the 
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court of appeals rejected the 
argument that Koenig was entitled 
to a type of "hybrid" representa-
tion. Id. at 505, 687 A.2d at 974. 
F or support, the court referred 
extensively to Parren v. State, 309 
Md. 260, S23 A.2d S97 (1987). In 
Parren, the court of appeals held 
tha~ "[t]he [two] rights are 
mutually exclusive, and the defen-
dant cannot assert both simul-
taneously." Harris at 505, 687 
A.2d at 974 (quoting Parren, 309 
Md. at 264, 523 A.2d at 599). In 
justifying its position, the court of 
appeals pointed out that such a 
hybrid relationship is merely the 
availability of counsel to provide 
assistance to the pro se defendant, 
and is therefore not seen as 
"representation." Id. at SII, 687 
A.2d at 977. Since such assistance 
failed to fall into one of the two 
mutually exclusive categories of 
constitutionally protected repre-
sentation (representation by 
counsel and representation pro se), 
the court determined that there was 
no underlying basis for a hybrid 
right to exist. Id. at 511, 687 A.2d 
at 977. 
Next, the court focused on 
determining whether Koenig 
validly waived his constitutional 
right to representation. Id. at SOS, 
687 A.2d at 974. The court 
recognized that in certain in-
stances, it is within the discretion 
of the trial court to appoint standby 
counsel. Id. at S06, 687 A.2d 974. 
Distinguishing the facts of the 
instant case from previous 
decisions that upheld court orders 
27.2 U. Bait. L.F. 67 
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for standby counsel, the court of 
appeals concluded that the trial 
court forced the OPD to serve as 
standby counsel for a defendant 
who knowingly and willingly 
waived his right to counsel. Id. at 
508,687 A.2d at 975. 
The court referred to the Public 
Defender Act that outlines the 
duties of the OPD, and presented 
in detail several sections of Article 
27 A, indicating that the OPD is 
expected to provide the con-
stitutional guarantee of represen-
tation, in conjunction with "related 
necessary services." Id at 508-09, 
687 A.2d at 975-76. The OPD 
argued that when examined in the 
context of Parren, defendant's 
informed and willing waiver of 
counsel, within the context of 
Maryland Rule 4-214, negates any 
right the defendant would other-
wise have to such representation. 
Id at 510, 687 A.2d at 976. The 
court concluded that this reasoning 
retracted the right of the trial court 
to order the OPD to appoint 
standby counsel. Id at 511, 687 
A.2d at 977. 
To ensure the validity of the 
decision, however, the court ex-
amined an instance where repre-
sentation should be provided by 
the OPD despite the lack of con-
stitutional entitlement. Id at 511, 
687 A.2d at 977. The court 
acknowledged that a defendant 
addressing a pretrial procedure 
often requires the assistance of 
counsel. Id at 512, 687 A.2d at 
977 (citing Webster v. State, 299 
Md. 581,474 A.2d 1305 (1984)). 
Although the Sixth Amendment 
does not specifically authorize this 
27.2 U. Bait. L.F. 68 
service, the Public Defender Act 
provides for such assistance in 
order to promote fairness to the 
defendant in such a critical stage of 
the proceedings. Id. at 511-12, 
687 A.2d at 977. 
The court of appeals 
distinguished the instant case from 
Webster, however, by indicating 
that such representation is ex-
pressly provided for the defendant 
in the Public Defender Act in "all 
stages of the proceedings." Id at 
513, n.11, 687 A.2d at 977. In the 
instant case, the fact that Koenig 
knowingly and willingly waived 
his right to counsel prohibits the 
OPD from being forced to provide 
standby assistance. Id at 514, 687 
A.2d at 978. Although the State 
argued that the phrase "related 
necessary services" should apply 
to such representation, the court 
rejected the State's interpretation 
of the statute and determined that 
the OPD's contention was indeed 
correct. Id 
Harris v. State presents a 
hurdle for future pro se defendants. 
Although a defendant is entitled to 
self representation, there will 
always be a moment when assis-
tance would be beneficial to one 
who is unfamiliar with the 
technicalities of the law. If a per-
son chooses to assume res-
ponsibility for his representation 
by willingly and knowingly dis-
charging coUnsel, he essentially 
relinquishes all rights to court-
appointed assistance should the 
OPD refuse to provide standby 
assistance. Therefore, the pos-
sibility is created that a defendant 
may retain counsel with whom he 
does not completely agree out of 
fear that potential obstacles could 
defeat his case completely. This 
decision narrows the options of 
defendants in criminal cases, and 
forces the legal world to carefully 
scrutinize the phrase "effective 
assistance of counsel." 
